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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction entered

after a jury found Mr. Dean Padgett guilty of felony battery on a police officer in
violation of I.C. § 18-915(3)(b).
B.

General Course of Proceedings
On January 12, 2016, a plain clothes officer followed a vehicle in which Mr

Padgett was the front passenger. Tr. p. 124, ln. 21 - p. 125, ln. 9. The vehicle parked
near an emission testing station in a parking lot and the officer parked
approximately 150 yards away in a parking lot across the street to continue his
surveillance. Id. at p. 125, ln 10-24; p. 127, ln. 5-10.
Mr. Padgett exited the vehicle and he, the driver and the emission stand
attendant conversed for several minutes at the driver’s door. Id. at p. 126, ln. 4-14;
127, ln. 2-4; 127, ln 16 - p. 128, ln. 5. Mr. Padgett and the attendant then began
“swinging at each other” in a fist fight. Id. at p. 128, ln. 8-10. The plain clothes
officer called in the fist fight requesting a “code 3” response with lights and sirens.
Id. at p. 129, ln. 3-8.
Meanwhile, two brothers on their way to the store stopped to observe Mr.
Padgett and the attendant to see if the fight would get interesting. The brothers
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prepared to leave since the fight did not seem serious and they thought the pair
might just be playing around. Id. at p. 163, ln. 2-9.
Mr. Padget and attendant had separated and were exchanging words at the
time officers arrived with lights and sirens a few minutes later. Id. at p. 130, ln.
10-16. Mr. Padgett re-entered the vehicle as two patrol vehicles arrived. Id. at p.
169, ln. 1-5; p. 131, ln. 2-12. Police exited their vehicles with weapons drawn and
commanded the vehicle’s occupants to put their hands up, intending to detain
everyone to investigate the fist fight. Id. at p. 169, ln. 1-5; p. 146, ln. 6-8; p. 169, ln.
1-5; p. 170, ln. 5-20. The plain clothes officer drove across the street to join the other
officers. Id. at p. 131, ln. 13 - p. 132, ln. 21. Mr. Padgett’s hands did not stay up and
officers purportedly saw him place a golf size baggie with a crystal-like substance in
his mouth. Id. at p. 133, ln. 4 - p. 134, ln. 10; p. 172, ln. 14-21; 174, ln. 16 - p. 175,
ln. 7.
A uniformed officer approached Mr. Padgett in the vehicle and holstered his
firearm once he saw that Mr. Padgett was unarmed. Id. at p. 135, ln. 9-19. The
officer then opened the passenger door and grabbed Mr. Padgett on the right arm,
intending to forcibly remove him from the vehicle. Id. at p. 175, ln. 7-24. Mr.
Padgett twisted away and slapped at the officer’s hands and arms in an attempt to
remove the officer’s hands from his person. Id. at p. 136, ln. 10-19; p. 176, ln. 20- p.
177, ln. 13.
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The officer punched Mr. Padgett in the upper chest, struck him several other
times, and eventually yanked Mr. Padgett from the vehicle. Id. at p. 177, ln. 18-21;
p. 193, ln. 1-3; Exhibit 1. The officer struck Mr. Padgett several times in attempt to
get him on the ground. Id. at p. 193, ln. 11-13; Exhibit 1, :40-1:04. Several officers
overpowered Mr. Padgett and placed him in handcuffs. Id. at p. 180, ln. 22-24; p.
193, ln. 11-13. The officers took Mr. Padgett to the hospital to treat his injuries. Id.
at p. 187, ln. 9-15.
The state charged Mr. Padgett with felony battery on a law enforcement
officer pursuant to I.C. §18-915(3).1 R. 197. Specifically, the state alleged that Mr.
Padgett “willfully and unlawfully use[d] force and/or violence upon the person of
[the officer] by striking the officer in the arm and/ or upper body, where the
Defendant knew or had reason to know that [the officer] was a police officer and did
commit said battery while [the officer] was engaged in the performance of his
duties.” R. 198.
The district court instructed the jury as to the elements in Instruction13,
which provided:

The state also charged Mr. Padgett with three misdemeanors: destruction, alteration or
concealment of the substance he allegedly placed in his mouth; resisting and obstructing arrest
and battery on the emission’s stand operator. R. 197-98.
1
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In order for the defendant to be guilty of Battery on a Law Enforcement
Officer in Count I, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about January 12, 2016,
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Dean Padgett committed a battery
4. upon [the officer]
5. by willfully and unlawfully using force and or violence upon [the officer],
and
6. at the time of the offense, [the officer] was a Boise Police Officer, and
7. the defendant knew or had reason to know [the officer] was a Boise Police
Officer.
R. 226. Instruction 14 appeared just below Instruction 13 on the same page and
instructed:
A “battery” is committed when a person:
(1) willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another; or
(2) actually, intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person
against
the will of the other; or
(3) unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual.
R. 226. Defense counsel objected to neither instruction. Tr. p. 234, ln. 7-18. The jury
found Mr. Padgett guilty felony battery of on a law enforcement officer, resisting
arrest and destroying evidence. R. 235. The jury acquitted Mr. Padgett of the
battery on the attendant, instead finding him guilty of the lesser-included offense,
fighting. R. 235.
The district court sentenced Mr. Padgett to a unified term of five years with a
minimum period of confinement of two years. R. 238-39. This appeal follows.
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III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the jury instructions, which omitted an element of the offense and

allowed the jury to find Mr. Padgett guilty of a felony for unlawful touching, violate
Mr. Padgett’s right to due process and affect his substantial rights?

IV. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH OMITTED AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE AND ALLOWED THE JURY TO FIND MR. PADGETT GUILTY
OF UNLAWFUL TOUCHING VIOLATED MR. PADGETT’S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS AND MUST HAVE EFFECTED THE TRIAL’S OUTCOME
The state charged Mr. Padgett pursuant to I.C. § 18-915(3)(b), which applies
when a person batters a police officer as battery is defined in I.C. § 18-903 “except
unlawful touching as described in section 18-903(b).” Specifically, the state alleged
Mr. Padgett was guilty by using force and violence in violation of I.C. § 18-903(a).
The state was also required to prove that Mr. Padgett committed the battery while
the officer was “engaged in the performance of his duties” and that Mr. Padgett
knew or reasonably should known that the officer’s status. I.C. § 18-915(3)(b).
Jury Instruction 13 relieved the state of it’s burden to prove that the officer
was engaged in the performance of his duties. Further, Instruction 14 defined a
battery as including an unlawful touching and, especially because Instructions 13
and 14 are on the same page, the jury could have applied the general battery
definition to the elements instruction for battery on a police officer.
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Because defense counsel failed to object to these instructions, they must be
reviewed under the fundamental error test articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). This three-part test requires: (1) the defendant must
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights
were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant
must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights,
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings. State v. Gibbs, 162 Idaho 782, 405 P.3d 567, 570 (2017); Perry, 150
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
The jury instructions violated Mr. Padgett’s constitutional right for the jury
to be instructed on every element of the offense. The error was plain and there was
no tactical benefit in relieving the state of its burden to prove every element.
Finally, police conducted a felony stop with firearms drawn in response to a
simple fist fight. After the officer confirmed Mr. Padgett was unarmed, he violently
removed him from the vehicle and responded to Mr. Padgett’s open-handed
defensive motions by punching Mr. Padgett with a closed fist multiple times.
Substantial evidence supports that the officers were not engaged in the lawful
performance of their duties and used excessive force. The jury also could have
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mistakenly applied the general battery definition found on the same page as the
elements instruction and concluded that Mr. Padgett’s open handed defensive
measures constituted an “unlawful touching.” The jury instruction error was
fundamental and this Court should vacate Mr. Padgett’s judgment of conviction.
A.

The Jury Instructions Violated Mr. Padgett’s Due Process
Right to Have the Jury Correctly Instructed on the Law and on
Every Element of the Offense
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right under the due process clause

to have the jury receive instruction on every element of the crime. State v. Sutton,
151 Idaho 161, 166, 254 P.3d 62, 67 (Ct. App. 2011). Here, the jury was not required
to find that Mr. Padgett battered the officer while he was “engaged in the
performance of his duties.”
While no cases appear discuss the “duty” element in the context of I.C. §
18-915, the statutory language and pattern instruction is similar to I.C. § 18–705
and ICJI 1260. The term “duty” encompasses only lawful and authorized acts of a
public officer and, consequently, where an individual refuses to obey an order an act
of a public officer that is contrary to the law, be it statute or constitution, that
individual is not guilty of violating the statute. State v. Gamma, 143 Idaho 751, 754,
152 P.3d 622, 625 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 502, 36 P.3d 1287,
1290 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 180, 755 P.2d 471, 477 (Ct.
App.1988).
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Similarly, the officer was not engaged in his duties if he initiated an
unreasonable detention or used excessive force. See State v. Garner, 159 Idaho 896,
367 P.3d 720, 723 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied (Apr. 5, 2016); State v. Spurr, 114
Idaho 277, 755 P.2d 1315 (Ct. App. 1988). If an officer uses unreasonable or
excessive force in detaining a person for questioning, the person being detained may
lawfully use reasonable force to protect himself. Garner, 159 Idaho at 899, 367 P.3d
at 723; Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (“ICJI”) 1263.
The instructions as a whole also created a substantial risk the jury could find
Mr. Padgett guilty of a crime with which he was not charged — unlawfully touching
or striking the officer. Line 3 of Instruction 13 instructs that the state must prove
“the defendant Dean Padgett committed a battery.” Instruction 14, directly
underneath Instruction 13 and on the same page, instructs that a battery includes
unlawful touching and striking. Unlawful touching of an officer is expressly
exempted from I.C. § 18-915(3) and Mr. Padgett was not charged with unlawfully
striking the officer. The potential confusion created by these instructions violated
Mr. Padgett’s right to a fair trial.
B.

The Error was Plain
By omitting an element of the offense, the district court deviated from the

ICJI 1212. The Supreme Court has urged trial courts to follow the ICJI as closely as
possible to avoid creating unnecessary grounds for appeal. McKay v. State, 148
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Idaho 567, 571, 225 P.3d 700, 704 (2010); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647, 962
P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). Nevertheless, the transcript reflects that neither the
district court, the prosecutor nor the defense noticed the missing language from the
district court’s instruction. There is no apparent tactical reason to relieve the state
from proving an element of the offense. Left with only speculation that trial counsel
made a tactical decision not to object, information outside the record is not
necessary to determine that counsel’s failure to object was not a strategic decision.
See Sutton, 151 Idaho at 167, 254 P.3d at 68.
C.

The Errors Affected Mr. Padgett’s Substantial Rights
Police responded to a report of a simple fist fight with multiple officers and

weapons drawn. The plain clothes officer conceded that he did not know the
vehicle’s occupants and his call for assistance was based solely on the fist fight. Tr.
p. 141, ln. 20-23; 142, ln. 5-16. The officer did not see any knives, firearms, baseball
bats or any other weapons during the fist fight. Id. at p. 143, ln. 4-15. Nobody got
knocked down. Id. at p. 144, ln. 4-8. While the officer decided to follow the vehicle
based on the area it was in, he had no specific and individualized facts to support
any suspicion to justify the aggressive efforts to detain Mr. Padgett and the others.
Additionally, after determining that Mr. Padgett was not holding a weapon,
the officer attempted to grab him from the vehicle and punched him several times in
response to Mr. Padgett’s open handed attempts to get the officer’s hands off him.
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Id. at p. 136, ln. 10-13. The officer testified that he had been trained that the use of
force must be reasonable under the circumstances and under the resistance or the
force that's being perpetrated against you. Id. at p. 178, ln. 2-10 (emphasis added).
The officer’s own testimony established that he used more force than Mr. Padgett in
order to gain compliance and thus his force was excessive under the officer’s own
understanding of the policy.
A person has a constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force by
law enforcement officers and has a right to defend himself or herself against the use
of excessive force by an officer. Garner, 159 Idaho at899, 367 P.3d at 724; Spurr, 114
Idaho at 279, 755 P.2d at 1317. The determination of whether excessive force has
been used is a question of fact for the jury. Id.
In Garner, the Court found that whether the officer’s force was excessive and
whether the defendant’s responding use of force was reasonable were questions for
the jury to decide. The Court held “it was crucial that the jury was informed that, if
the officer used excessive force, [the defendant] had a right to reasonably defend
himself” and that “the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on selfdefense in response to excessive force by an officer.” Garner, 159 Idaho at899, 367 P.
3d at 724.
Here, the facts would have have supported an excessive force instruction had
counsel requested one. Moreover, the elements instruction relieved the state from
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proving the officer was engaged in the performance of his duties. Most of the
testimony regarding Mr. Padgett’s defensive actions in slapping away the officer
could have construed as “touching” or “striking” instead of the use of force or
violence. There is a grave risk that the jury found Mr. Padgett guilty
notwithstanding the officer’s use of excessive force or for misdemeanor conduct. Had
the jury been fully and correctly instructed, the outcome of the trial would have
been different.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court’s error in the instructing the jury violated Mr. Padgett’s
unwaived constitutional rights, was plain and affected his substantial rights.
According, Mr. Padgett asks the Court to vacate his judgment of conviction for
battery on a police officer.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of February 2018
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Dean Padgett

11
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Criminal Law Division of the Idaho Attorney General at ecf@ag.idaho.gov
on February 8, 2018.
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
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